

Log Hunting with Sigma A hands-on introduction to Sigma rules and the conversion tool

Thomas Patzke, 17. October 2018

Prerequisites

Requirements:

- Python 3.5 or 3.6 https://www.python.org/downloads/release/python-365/
- Docker CE (current version)
- Clone of the Sigma workshop repository: https://github.com/thomaspatzke/sigmaworkshop

```
git clone --recursive \
https://github.com/thomaspatzke/sigma-workshop.git
```

Sigma dependencies:

```
pip3 install -r sigma/tools/requirements.txt
Or apt-get install python3-yaml
```

• Elasticsearch and Kibana with log data:

- docker load -i sigma-workshop-docker.tar
- docker-compose -f es_kibana.docker-compose.yml up
- ./sigma_workshop_prepare_es.sh

Overview

- A short (!) introduction to Sigma
- Writing a log Signature for:
 - Execution of a Mimikatz release binary (process execution by hash)
 - Common parameter usage of NirSoft's NetPass tool (process execution by command line)
 - WCE LSASS injection behaviour
- Building a Sigma Converter configuration
- Convert to Elasticsearch query and search ELK instance
- Generic log sources

Sigma Introduction

- Generic signature format for description of log events
 - YAML-based
 - Indicators: Key-Value, Key-List and Value-only
 - Conditions and aggregations

Build

(Editor/Tools)

Meta-data: Title, description, authors, tags (ATT&CK), severity, ...

Sigma Rule

Convert

(sigmac)


Ouerv

- Conversion tool sigmac
- Workflow:


Interesting Log

Event

Sigma Rule – Example 1



Sigma Rule – Example 2



Advantages

- Reduced vendor lock-in
- Distribution of log signatures in heterogeneous environments or in blog posts/threat intel products
- Build one rule and use it in your SIEM, alerting, endpoint security solution or even for grepping in log files and querying from PowerShell
- 220+ Sigma rules in GitHub repository
- Evolving tool/services support: MISP conversion extension, online editor, ...
- Intermediate language for generation of queries from IOCs in other formats
- Increasing community contribution

Sigma Goals and Scope

- Being human-writable and readable
 - No XML or JSON, no deeply nested structures
- Machine-readable and writable
 - YAML, no ambiguities
- Simpleness
 - Expressiveness for 95% of log signatures
 - NOT: description of every imaginable SIEM use case or threat hunting technique
 - It should be relatively easy to build an own Sigma parser
- Tooling: it should be practicably usable, not just theory

Enough Theory!

Let's get our hands dirty!

Exercise 1 Mimikatz Release Binary

- Let's assume we're targeted by an attacker who is known to use the Mimikatz 2.1.1 release
- SHA256 hashes (see challenges/1-Mimikatz_2.1.1_Hashes.txt):
 - 97f93fe103c5a3618b505e82a1ce2e0e90a481aae102e52814742badd d9fed41 ./Win32/mimilove.exe
 - 6bfc1ec16f3bd497613f57a278188ff7529e94eb48dcabf81587f7c275
 b3e86d ./Win32/mimikatz.exe
 - e46ba4bdd4168a399ee5bc2161a8c918095fa30eb20ac88cac6ab1d6
 dbea2b4a ./x64/mimikatz.exe
- Write a rule for Sysmon events that detects execution of the above binaries (EventID 1) by utilization of the *Hashes* field

Exercise 1 Possible Solution

title: Mimikatz detection status: stable description: Detects Mimikatz 2.1.1 release by recognition of executable hashes tags:

- attack.s0002
- attack.t1003
- attack.lateral_movement
- attack.credential_access


logsource:

- product: windows
- service: sysmon
- detection:
 - selection:
 - EventID: 1
 - Hashes:
 - 97f93fe103c5a3618b505e82a1ce2e0e90a481aae102e52814742baddd9fed41
 - 6bfclec16f3bd497613f57a278188ff7529e94eb48dcabf81587f7c275b3e86d
 - e46ba4bdd4168a399ee5bc2161a8c918095fa30eb20ac88cac6ab1d6dbea2b4a
 - condition: selection
- level: high

Rule Conversion with Sigma Converter

- The Sigma Converter (sigmac) is located in tools/sigmac in the Sigma repository
- Run it with --help to get an overview
- Convert into target query language (-t) es-qs (Elasticsearch Query String)
- No matches! Why?
 - Sigma rules are (or should be) generic, so some further work is required
 - Mapping of field names:
 - EventID \rightarrow event_id
 - Hashes \rightarrow event_data.Hashes
 - EventID 1 may also appear from other sources, search needs to be restricted to log source by addition of further conditions
- Sigma conversion configuration defines the transformation

Sigma Converter Configuration



Try Again – with Configuration!

- Try to write your own configuration
- Configurations can be passed to Sigma converter with parameter -c

Further Exercises

- Exercise 2: NirSoft NetPass
 - NetPass has some very characteristic parameter names: /stext, /stab, /scomma, /stabular, /shtml, /sverhtml, /sxml
 - Write a rule for Sysmon process creation events and utilize the *CommandLine* field for identification of parameter usage, don't:
 - Try to match hashes of any releases
 - Match the file name
- Exercise 3: WCE LSASS Injection
 - WCE causes a burst of Sysmon CreateRemoteThread (EventID 8) events into Isass.exe (TargetImage)
 - Further, some security products also inject into LSASS, but only WCE does without a *StartModule*. Filter these out.

Exercise 2 Possible Solution

title: Detection of Nirsoft NetPass parameter usage
status: stable
description: NetPass supported some characteristic parameters
tags:

- attack.credential_access
- attack.t1003

logsource:

product: windows

service: sysmon

detection:

selection:

EventID: 1

CommandLine:

- "* /stext"
- "* /stab"
- "* /scomma"
- "* /stabular"
- "* /shtml"
- "* /sverhtml"
- "* /sxml"

condition: selection
level: high

Exercise 3 Possible Solution

```
title: WCE Remote Thread Injection
status: stable
description: Detection of remote thread creation in LSASS by Windows Credential Editor
tags:
    - attack.credential access
    - attack.t1003
      attack.s0005
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: sysmon
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 8
        TargetImage: 'C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe'
    filter:
        StartModule: '*'
    condition: selection and not filter
level: high
```

Handling many Sigma Rules

- Copy and pasting rules between terminal and browser is not very convenient.
- Build a Kibana import file from all previous solutions with the *kibana* backend
- Import the generated file into Kibana

Generic Log Sources: Introduction

- There are different EventIDs for the same events
 - Process execution: Sysmon/1 and Security/4688
- Products that recognize such events, but don't know about these EventIDs
 - Windows Defender ATP and various other EDR products
- Causes
 - Redundancy: multiple rules for the same event
 - Inconsistency: one rule for a event id that may be recognized by another
 - Complex conversion (matching all EventIDs to target query language objects)

Generic Log Sources: Example

<pre>title: Bitsadmin Download status: experimental description: Detects usage of bits references:</pre>	<pre>title: Bitsadmin Download status: experimental description: Detects usage of bitsa references:</pre>
product: windows	<pre>logsource: category: process_creation</pre>
service: sysmon detection:	product: windows
selection:	detection: selection:
EventID: 1 Image:	Image:
- '*\bitsadmin.exe'	- '*\bitsadmin.exe'
CommandLine:	CommandLine: - '/transfer'
- '/transfer' condition: selection	condition: selection
fields:	fields:
- CommandLine DanastCommandLine	- CommandLine - ParentCommandLine
 ParentCommandLine falsepositives: 	falsepositives:
- Some legitimate apps use thi	- Some legitimate apps use this
level: medium	level: medium

Generic Log Sources: State & Usage

- Current state: open for testing
 - Many rules have to be converted
 - Project branch: project-1 (https://github.com/Neo23x0/sigma/tree/project-1)
- Usage: chained configurations
 - 1. Generic rule → specific Process creation → Sysmon/1
 - 2. Specific rule → Environment-specific rule
 Sysmon/1 → Sysmon/1 with field mappings and additional conditions
- Configuration for process creation to Sysmon already exists
- Let's try it!
 - Sigma Converter with generic log source support in directory sigma_with_generic_logsources/

Questions?

- E-Mail: thomas@patzke.org
- Twitter: @blubbfiction