



Disconnecting games with a single packet: an Unreal untold story

Hugo Bertin¹, Iliès Benhabbour², Prof. Marc Dacier², Prof. Yérom-David Bromberg¹

1. IRISA, Univ. Rennes; 2. KAUST

Hack.lu 2024

Table of Contents

Cheating in the video games industry

- New DoS attacks exploiting Unreal Engine networking components
- Demonstrations
- Practical exploitability of the attacks

Conclusion

Table of Contents

Cheating in the video games industry

- New DoS attacks exploiting Unreal Engine networking components
- Demonstrations
- Practical exploitability of the attacks

Conclusion

Video Games: a booming industry

Video Games: a booming industry

- A lot of money is involved!!!
 - Forecasted revenue of 455 billion USD in 2024
 - More than twice the global movie and entertainment market

Video Games: a booming industry

- A lot of money is involved!!!
 - Forecasted revenue of 455 billion USD in 2024
 - More than twice the global movie and entertainment market
- Massive investments
 - Saudi Arabia invested \$20B in the gaming sector [1]

[1] A. Raza, "Ali Raza on LinkedIn: #gaming #esports #investment #tech | 100 comments," *LinkedIn.com*, Oct. 06, 2024. <https://www.linkedin.com/feed/update/urn:li:activity:7248566123669925888/> (accessed Oct. 14, 2024).


Video Games: a booming industry

- A lot of money is involved!!!
 - Forecasted revenue of 455 billion USD in 2024
 - More than twice the global movie and entertainment market
- Massive investments
 - Saudi Arabia invested \$20B in the gaming sector [1]
- Continuously growing interest in Esports
 - The 2024 Esports World Cup in Riyadh attracted 500 million viewers [1]
 - The International 10 tournament's prize pool: \$40 million [2]
 - The first Olympic Esports games will be host in Saudi Arabia in 2025 [1]


[1] A. Raza, "Ali Raza on LinkedIn: #gaming #esports #investment #tech | 100 comments," *LinkedIn.com*, Oct. 06, 2024. <https://www.linkedin.com/feed/update/urn:li:activity:7248566123669925888/> (accessed Oct. 14, 2024).

[2] S. Nordmark and J. Heath, "The 10 Largest Prize Pools in Esports," *Dot Esports*, Aug. 28, 2019. <https://dotesports.com/general/news/biggest-prize-pools-esports-14605>


Cheating: a major threat to the industry



Cheating: a major threat to the industry



Cheating: a major threat to the industry



37 CS:GO coaches have been banned for abusing the Spectator bug

[1] E. Matthews, "37 CS:GO coaches have been banned for abusing the Spectator bug," *PC Gamer*, Sep. 28, 2020. <https://www.pcgamer.com/37-csgo-coaches-have-been-banned-for-abusing-the-spectator-bug/>

From Game Changers to Game Cheaters: Two Pro VALORANT Players Implicated by Riot Games in Cheating Scandal

[3] G. DeSena, "From Game Changers to Game Cheaters: Two Pro VALORANT Players Implicated by Riot Games in Cheating Scandal - Esports Illustrated," *Esports Illustrated On SI*, Jan. 17, 2024. <https://www.si.com/esports/valorant/noot-noot-cheating-scandal>

Does the video game industry have a \$29 billion cheating problem?

[2] "Does the video game industry have a \$29 billion cheating problem?," *Gamedeveloper.com*, 2020. <https://www.gamedeveloper.com/business/does-the-video-game-industry-have-a-29-billion-cheating-problem->

Report: Cheating Is Becoming A Big Problem In Online Gaming

[4] N. Granados, "Report: Cheating Is Becoming A Big Problem In Online Gaming," *Forbes*. <https://www.forbes.com/sites/nelsongranados/2018/04/30/report-cheating-is-becoming-a-big-problem-in-online-gaming/>


'Dota 2' Player Who Used Programmable Mouse Disqualified His Team From \$15 Million Tournament

[5] M. Gault, "'Dota 2' Player Who Used Programmable Mouse Disqualified His Team From \$15 Million Tournament," *VICE*, Jun. 25, 2018. <https://www.vice.com/en/article/dota-2-player-who-used-programmable-mouse-disqualified-his-team-from-dollar15-million-tournament/>

Cheating in Online Games

Cheating in Online Games

- Focus on the client
 - Client cheats: aimbots, wall-hacks...
 - Mitigation: Anti-Cheats



Cheating in Online Games

- Focus on the client
 - Client cheats: aimbots, wall-hacks...
 - Mitigation: Anti-Cheats
- The network can also be leveraged to cheat
 - => Our focus in this talk




Table of Contents


Cheating in the video games industry

- **New DoS attacks exploiting Unreal Engine networking components**
- Demonstrations
- Practical exploitability of the attacks

Conclusion

Game Engines

- Unreal Engine, Source Engine, Unity...
 - Game engines simplify video games development
 - Common libraries to re-use
 - Physics, graphics, networking
 - Used for server and client
- => Many games share pieces of software




Unreal Engine (UE)

- Unreal Engine
 - Epic Games' game engine
 - Publicly available source code
 - Powering famous games:
 - Fortnite, Valorant, PUBG, The Finals, Sea of Thieves ...

The Fortnite logo, featuring the word "FORTNITE" in a bold, white, sans-serif font with a black outline, set against a black background.

VALORANT



**UNREAL
ENGINE**



Unreal Engine Networking

Unreal Engine Networking

- Game communications use an application-layer protocol based on UDP

Unreal Engine Networking

- Game communications use an application-layer protocol based on UDP
- Joining a game session:
 1. First the player authenticates himself to the game provider's server to retrieve information to contact the game server (IP address, Port number).
 2. The game client contacts the game server to initiate a connection process to establish a connection through a handshake.
 3. Client and server can now exchange information about the game.

Unreal Engine Networking

- Game communications use an application-layer protocol based on UDP
- Joining a game session:
 1. First the player authenticates himself to the game provider's server to retrieve information to contact the game server (IP address, Port number).
 2. The game client contacts the game server to initiate a connection process to establish a connection through a handshake.
 3. Client and server can now exchange information about the game.
- The game server identify clients by their IP:Port


Unreal Engine Networking

- Game communications use an application-layer protocol based on UDP
- Joining a game session:
 1. First the player authenticates himself to the game provider's server to retrieve information to contact the game server (IP address, Port number).
 2. The game client contacts the game server to initiate a connection process to establish a connection through a handshake.
 3. Client and server can now exchange information about the game.
- The game server identify clients by their IP:Port
- The game server's IP:Port is the same for all the clients

High-level overview of the vulnerability

High-level overview of the vulnerability


- Related to the packets reception process in Unreal Engine



Packet received


High-level overview of the vulnerability

- Related to the packets reception process in Unreal Engine




High-level overview of the vulnerability

- Related to the packets reception process in Unreal Engine




High-level overview of the vulnerability

- Related to the packets reception process in Unreal Engine




High-level overview of the vulnerability

- Related to the packets reception process in Unreal Engine
- Disconnection: the client has to establish a new connection




High-level overview of the vulnerability

- Related to the packets reception process in Unreal Engine
- Disconnection: the client has to establish a new connection
- Same behaviour for the client and the server



High-level overview of the vulnerability

- Related to the packets reception process in Unreal Engine
- Disconnection: the client has to establish a new connection
- Same behaviour for the client and the server



=> Using the IP:Port of a registered player to send a faulty packet is enough to disconnect him.

How to identify faulty packets?

- Static code analysis on Unreal Engine source code (using Doxygen [3])
 - Call/Caller Graphs
 - Inheritance Diagrams
- Dynamic profiling on a toy game
 - Unreal Engine insight tools
 - Tracing, logging in Unreal Engine's source code

=> Trace the paths leading to a disconnection

=> Trace the engine behaviour

[3] Doxygen, "Doxygen: Generate documentation from source code," [Online]. Available: <https://www.doxygen.nl>.

How to identify faulty packets?


- Static code analysis on Unreal Engine source code (using Doxygen [3])
 - Call/Caller Graphs
 - Inheritance Diagrams
- Dynamic profiling on a toy game
 - Unreal Engine insight tools
 - Tracing, logging in Unreal Engine's source code

=> Trace the paths leading to a disconnection


=> Trace the engine behaviour

[3] Doxygen, "Doxygen: Generate documentation from source code," [Online]. Available: <https://www.doxygen.nl>.

Multiple paths leading to a disconnection




Multiple paths leading to a disconnection



Multiple paths leading to a disconnection

The method processing the received packets:
UNetConnection::ReceivedRawPackets

The disconnection process:
UNetConnection::Close




Multiple paths leading to a disconnection

Some methods are not related to packets reception processing:

UDemoNetDriver::RemoveSplitScreenViewer

The method processing the received packets:
UNetConnection::ReceivedRawPackets

The disconnection process:
UNetConnection::Close




Multiple paths leading to a disconnection

The method processing the received packets:
UNetConnection::ReceivedRawPackets

The disconnection process:
UNetConnection::Close


Methods that are not called upon
the reception of a packet



Multiple paths leading to a disconnection

The method processing the received packets:
UNetConnection::ReceivedRawPackets


The disconnection process:
UNetConnection::Close



Multiple paths leading to a disconnection

The method processing the received packets:
UNetConnection::ReceivedRawPackets

The disconnection process:
UNetConnection::Close



Crafting a faulty packet to disconnect a player

Crafting a faulty packet to disconnect a player

- We identified 5 different ways of crafting a packet not passing the sanity checks

Crafting a faulty packet to disconnect a player

- We identified 5 different ways of crafting a packet not passing the sanity checks
- None of these packets require knowledge about a previous packet

Crafting a faulty packet to disconnect a player

- We identified 5 different ways of crafting a packet not passing the sanity checks
- None of these packets require knowledge about a previous packet
- Only information required:
 - Source IP address / Port number
 - Destination IP address / Port number


Direction	Source	Destination
Client -> Server	Client's IP:Port	Server's IP:Port
Server -> Client	Server's IP:Port	Client's IP:Port

Can encryption protect against crafting faulty packets?

Can encryption protect against crafting faulty packets?

Packets have the following layout:


- *Header* contains protocol information
- *Packed Header Bunches* and *Bunches* contain game information
 - => Sensitive information that should not be exposed



Can encryption protect against crafting faulty packets?

Packets have the following layout:


- *Header* contains protocol information
 - *Packed Header Bunches* and *Bunches* contain game information
- => Sensitive information that should not be exposed



Can encryption protect against crafting faulty packets?

Packets have the following layout:


- *Header* contains protocol information
- *Packed Header Bunches* and *Bunches* contain game information
 - => Sensitive information that should not be exposed



Can encryption protecting against crafting faulty packets?

Packets have the following layout:


- *Header* contains protocol information
- *Packed Header Bunches* and *Bunches* contain game information
=> Sensitive information that should not be exposed



Can encryption protect against crafting faulty packets?

Packets have the following layout:


- *Header* contains protocol information
- *Packed Header Bunches* and *Bunches* contain game information
 - => Sensitive information that should not be exposed



Can encryption protect against crafting faulty packets?

Packets have the following layout:

- *Header* contains protocol information
- *Packed Header Bunches* and *Bunches* contain game information
 - => Sensitive information that should not be exposed
- Encryption is not applied to the *Header*



Can encryption protect against crafting faulty packets?

Packets have the following layout:

- *Header* contains protocol information
- *Packed Header Bunches* and *Bunches* contain game information

=> Sensitive information that should not be exposed

- Encryption is not applied to the *Header*

However, the header is attackable

=> Encryption is not a solution




Table of Contents

Cheating in the video games industry

- New DoS attacks exploiting Unreal Engine networking components
- **Demonstrations**
- Practical exploitability of the attacks

Conclusion

Demonstration 1: Valorant

Setting at the beginning of the video:

- Valorant match within a LAN (Esport scenario).
- Attackers: They have to place a bomb, taking 30 seconds to detonate.
- Defenders: They defend against the bomb, they can defuse the bomb (taking 7 seconds).
- Viewing the screen of a defender.

Scenario in the video:

1. Attackers place the bomb.
2. A defender kills the last attacker alive.
3. Defenders are likely to win: they have time to defuse the bomb.
4. Attackers launch an attack.
5. **Effect:** Defenders are repeatedly disconnected. When they re-join the game, they have to start the defusing action again.

Demonstration 1: Valorant

<https://youtu.be/dWy-L1ZQZw4>


Demonstration 2: Fortnite

Setting at the beginning of the video:

- Fortnite game on PS5
- Online game scenario
- 3 players A, B and C (all opponents)

Scenario in the video:

1. Player B kills player C, the information is displayed on the screen.
2. Player A uses this information to try to connect to B to get his IP, using the PSN P2P calls.
3. Player B answers the incoming call.
4. Player A launches an attack.
5. **Effect:** Player B gets kicked out of the game.



Demonstration 2: Fortnite

<https://youtu.be/NJEW9E2rXk>

Table of Contents

Cheating in the video games industry

- New DoS attacks exploiting Unreal Engine networking components
- Demonstrations
- **Practical exploitability of the attacks**

Conclusion

Responsible Disclosure

- Submitted to 5 video game studios impacted by the vulnerability
 - Epic Games (Fortnite), Riot Games (Valorant), Sea of Thieves (Rare/Xbox Game studio), Krafton (PUBG), Embark (The Finals)
- Detailed explanation on how to reproduce the attacks
 - Video demonstrations
 - A server they could use to reproduce the attacks

Responsible Disclosure

- Reports considered as informative: “Hard to reproduce in a concrete real-life case”

Responsible Disclosure

- Reports considered as informative: “Hard to reproduce in a concrete real-life case”
 - i. “It is hard to find the IP address on the Internet.”

Responsible Disclosure

- Reports considered as informative: “Hard to reproduce in a concrete real-life case”
 - i. “It is hard to find the IP address on the Internet.”
 - ii. “It is hard to spoof an IP addresses on the Internet.”

Responsible Disclosure

- Reports considered as informative: “Hard to reproduce in a concrete real-life case”
 - i. “It is hard to find the IP address on the Internet.”
 - ii. “It is hard to spoof an IP addresses on the Internet.”
 - iii. “Players are protected by firewalls.”

i. Finding the IP address of an opponent

i. Finding the IP address of an opponent

- Players can play within the same LAN
 - Esport
- In a LAN
 - Finding the victim's IP addresses is not needed
 - Broadcast MAC address: `FF:FF:FF:FF:FF:FF`
 - Broadcast IP address: `255.255.255.255`
 - The only information needed: victim's Port number
 - Possible ports: dynamic port range (49152 to 65535)
=> Easy to bruteforce
 - To avoid being incriminated, the sender can:
 - Spoof another source address (MAC layer)
 - Target himself

	Source	Dest
Port	Server's Port	Bruteforce
IP	Server's IP	255.255.255. .255
MAC	00-B0-D0-63- C2-26	FF:FF:FF:FF:F F:FF

i. Finding the IP address of an opponent

In an online game scenario:

i. Finding the IP address of an opponent

In an online game scenario:

- Other mediums can be exploited
 - Voice communication channels
 - Redirection in text cheats or Discord servers
 - Gamertag-IP databases
 - Social engineering

i. Finding the IP address of an opponent

In an online game scenario:

- Other mediums can be exploited
 - Voice communication channels
 - Redirection in text chats or Discord servers
 - Gamertag-IP databases
 - Social engineering
 - In our demonstration on Fortnite: Play Station Network
 - PlayStation's voice communication channel
 - Peer-to-peer (P2P) architecture
- => Answering a call leaks IP address

ii. Hard to spoof an IP address on the Internet?

- IP spoofing: falsifying the source IP address
- Internet Service Providers (ISPs) theoretically implement Source Address Validation (SAV) as a countermeasure
 - Packets filtering implemented at the edge of Autonomous Systems
 - Ensures that the source IP address in a packet align with the network it is from

ii. Hard to spoof an IP address on the Internet?

- IP spoofing: falsifying the source IP address
- Internet Service Providers (ISPs) theoretically implement Source Address Validation (SAV) as a countermeasure
 - Packets filtering implemented at the edge of Autonomous Systems
 - Ensures that the source IP address in a packet align with the network it is from
- **However, not everyone is doing the job!!**
 - Some ISPs do not enforce SAV well
 - “69.8% of all the Autonomous Systems (ASes) in the Internet do not filter spoofed packets” [4]

[4] Tianxiang Dai and Haya Shulman. 2021. SMap: Internet-wide Scanning for Spoofing. In Proceedings of the 37th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference (ACSAC '21). Association for Computing Machinery, New York, NY, USA, 1039–1050. <https://doi.org/10.1145/3485832.3485917>

ii. Hard to spoof an IP address on the Internet?

- How to find them? The Spoofer Project [5]
 - Measurement platforms pinpointing Autonomous Systems (AS) where SAV is not well-implemented.
 - Results are published on their website.
 - Steps to set up a server:
 1. Identify a vulnerable AS with spoofer [6].
 2. Contact the service provider to rent a dedicated server.
 3. **You are now able to spoof IP addresses!!**

[5] Center for Applied Internet Data Analysis, "Spoofer Project," CAIDA. [Online]. Available: <https://www.caida.org/projects/spoofer/>.

[6] Center for Applied Internet Data Analysis, "Spoofer: Recent Tests," CAIDA. [Online]. Available: https://spoofer.caida.org/recent_tests.php.

iii. Players are protected by firewalls

iii. Players are protected by firewalls

- Players are playing behind firewalls, the address exposed is owned by the firewall and not by the victim

	Source	Dest
Port		
IP		

iii. Players are protected by firewalls

- Players are playing behind firewalls, the address exposed is owned by the firewall and not by the victim
- Players are continuously communicating with the game server
 - Any packet with the right quadruple Source IP:Port; Destination IP:Port is accepted by the firewall and routed to the player

	Source	Dest
Port		
IP		

iii. Players are protected by firewalls

- Players are playing behind firewalls, the address exposed is owned by the firewall and not by the victim
- Players are continuously communicating with the game server
 - Any packet with the right quadruple Source IP:Port; Destination IP:Port is accepted by the firewall and routed to the player
- The game server IP:Port are the same for all the players
 - => The Source IP:Port is known

	Source	Dest
Port	Server's Port	
IP	Server's IP	

iii. Players are protected by firewalls

- Players are playing behind firewalls, the address exposed is owned by the firewall and not by the victim
- Players are continuously communicating with the game server
 - Any packet with the right quadruple Source IP:Port; Destination IP:Port is accepted by the firewall and routed to the player
- The game server IP:Port are the same for all the players
 - => The Source IP:Port is known

	Source	Dest
Port	Server's Port	
IP	Server's IP	Firewall's IP

iii. Players are protected by firewalls

- Players are playing behind firewalls, the address exposed is owned by the firewall and not by the victim
- Players are continuously communicating with the game server
 - Any packet with the right quadruple Source IP:Port; Destination IP:Port is accepted by the firewall and routed to the player
- The game server IP:Port are the same for all the players
 - => The Source IP:Port is known
- We need to find the port used by the player
 - Range of possible ports 0-65535
 - Packets of 48 bytes on wire are enough to disconnect
 - At 25 Mbps, it takes 1 s to bruteforce
 - => Can be bruteforced easily

	Source	Dest
Port	Server's Port	Bruteforce
IP	Server's IP	Firewall's IP

Potential mitigations

- Modifying Unreal Engine source code to:
 - Encrypt the whole packet
 - Drop suspicious packets (without disconnecting)
- Securing the transport layer
 - E.g. using TLS (Transport Layer Security) providing authentication, confidentiality and integrity to TCP, or UDP with DTLS.
- Despite reporting the vulnerability to Epic Games, no fix was observed
- Unreal Engine's code is available => Game developers can directly implement their modifications.

Table of Contents

Cheating in the video games industry

- New DoS attacks exploiting Unreal Engine networking components
- Demonstrations
- Practical exploitability of the attacks

Conclusion

Conclusion

Conclusion

- While being powerful tools, game engine inadvertently broaden the scope of vulnerabilities.

Conclusion

- While being powerful tools, game engine inadvertently broaden the scope of vulnerabilities.
=> Enforcing security at the engine level is primordial to strengthen the overall game industry.

Conclusion

- While being powerful tools, game engine inadvertently broaden the scope of vulnerabilities.
 - => Enforcing security at the engine level is primordial to strengthen the overall game industry.
- We disclosed and explained new DoS attacks, which are easy to put in practice.

Conclusion

- While being powerful tools, game engine inadvertently broaden the scope of vulnerabilities.
 - => Enforcing security at the engine level is primordial to strengthen the overall game industry.
- We disclosed and explained new DoS attacks, which are easy to put in practice.
 - => Eye-opener for that community. The erroneous reply from the video games editors shows a lack of awareness and consideration about the network-level security in online games.

Conclusion

- While being powerful tools, game engine inadvertently broaden the scope of vulnerabilities.
 - => Enforcing security at the engine level is primordial to strengthen the overall game industry.
- We disclosed and explained new DoS attacks, which are easy to put in practice.
 - => Eye-opener for that community. The erroneous reply from the video games editors shows a lack of awareness and consideration about the network-level security in online games.
- Potential impact beyond video games. Unreal Engine also used in: VR, digital twins, automotive HMI...
 - It might lead to a more critical issue tomorrow.

Conclusion

- While being powerful tools, game engine inadvertently broaden the scope of vulnerabilities.
 - => Enforcing security at the engine level is primordial to strengthen the overall game industry.
- We disclosed and explained new DoS attacks, which are easy to put in practice.
 - => Eye-opener for that community. The erroneous reply from the video games editors shows a lack of awareness and consideration about the network-level security in online games.
- Potential impact beyond video games. Unreal Engine also used in: VR, digital twins, automotive HMI...
 - It might lead to a more critical issue tomorrow.
 - => Extremely important to let people know about it and fix it.

Thank you for your attention!!

Questions?



hugo.bertin35@gmail.com




[linkedin.com/in/bertin-hugo/](https://www.linkedin.com/in/bertin-hugo/)

References

- [1] A. Raza, "Ali Raza on LinkedIn: #gaming #esports #investment #tech | 100 comments," *LinkedIn.com*, Oct. 06, 2024. <https://www.linkedin.com/feed/update/urn:li:activity:7248566123669925888/>. [Accessed: Oct. 7, 2024].
- [2] S. Nordmark and J. Heath, "The 10 Largest Prize Pools in Esports," *Dot Esports*, Aug. 28, 2019. <https://dotesports.com/general/news/biggest-prize-pools-esports-14605>. [Accessed: Oct. 7, 2024].
- [3] Doxygen, "Doxygen: Generate documentation from source code," [Online]. Available: <https://www.doxygen.nl>. [Accessed: Oct. 7, 2024].
- [4] Tianxiang Dai and Haya Shulman. 2021. SMap: Internet-wide Scanning for Spoofing. In Proceedings of the 37th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference (ACSAC '21). Association for Computing Machinery, New York, NY, USA, 1039–1050. <https://doi.org/10.1145/3485832.3485917>
- [5] Center for Applied Internet Data Analysis, "Spoofing Project," *CAIDA*. [Online]. Available: <https://www.caida.org/projects/spoofing/>. [Accessed: Oct. 7, 2024].
- [6] Center for Applied Internet Data Analysis, "Spoofing: Recent Tests," *CAIDA*. [Online]. Available: https://spoofing.caida.org/recent_tests.php. [Accessed: Oct. 7, 2024].


Multiple paths leading to a disconnection

Method	Condition to close	Exploit
<i>UNetConnection::ReceivedRawPacket</i>	PacketHandler returns an error processing the packet: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Handshake packet handler: <i>StatelessConnectHandlerComponent</i> Decryption handlers 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Handshake bit to 1, packet not compliant to the handshake protocol If using encryption, garbage packet



Multiple paths leading to a disconnection

Method	Condition to close	Exploit
<i>UNetConnection::ReceivedPacket</i>	Wrong Acked Sequence (≠Last Notified PacketId)	Bad information in the Packed Header



Multiple paths leading to a disconnection

Method	Condition to close	
<i>UNetConnection::DispatchPacket</i>	Bad channel index	Bad information in the Bunch

