

III CLI ambush

Cryptographic toolkit command line output gone wild
Hack.lu 2025

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Outline

- X.509, ASN.1, DER & PEM overview
- CVE-2022-0778 & cryptographic data structures editing
- The story behind this talk
- Experiments & findings
- Real world implications

X.509, ASN.1, DER & PEM overview

An X.509 certificate is an ASN.1 structure usually encoded as a DER binary object
maybe encapsulated in PEM format

PEM format ? DER binary object ?? ASN.1 structure ???!

An X.509 certificate printed with the `openssl x509` command

```
$ echo | openssl s_client -connect google.com:443 | openssl x509 -text -noout
Certificate:
  Data:
    Version: 3 (0x2)
    Serial Number:
      df:5b:69:1b:21:76:4a:32:12:1c:2f:37:8b:e5:96:d3
    Signature Algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption
    Issuer: C = US, O = Google Trust Services, CN = WR2
    Validity
      Not Before: Jan 27 08:35:27 2025 GMT
      Not After : Apr 21 08:35:26 2025 GMT
    Subject: CN = *.google.com
    Subject Public Key Info:
      Public Key Algorithm: id-ecPublicKey
      Public-Key: (256 bit)
      pub:
        04:a0:26:86:48:d6:05:d9:37:36:b3:e3:d0:44:3e:
        [...]
        7b:85:b9:a8:7f
      ASN1 OID: prime256v1
      NIST CURVE: P-256
    X509v3 extensions:
      X509v3 Key Usage: critical
        Digital Signature
      X509v3 Extended Key Usage:
        TLS Web Server Authentication
  [...]

```

Abstract Syntax Notation One - ASN.1

- **IDL** – **I**nterface **D**escription **L**anguage
- "Used to define data structures that can be serialized and deserialized in a cross-platform way" (source <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ASN.1>)
- ITU-T & ISO/IEC standard from the 80's
- Used in PKCS, X.500, LDAP, Kerberos, SNMP, EMV, GSM, UMTS, LTE, 5G, . . .
- Our use case is the definition of **cryptographic data structures** such as X.509 certificates, RSA/EC keys, . . .
- Recommended reading:
<https://letsencrypt.org/docs/a-warm-welcome-to-asn1-and-der/>

ASN.1 Example – (grossly simplified) X.509 Certificate

```
Certificate ::= SEQUENCE {
    tbsCertificate      TBSCertificate,
    signatureAlgorithm  AlgorithmIdentifier,
    signature           BIT STRING
}

TBSCertificate ::= SEQUENCE {
    version INTEGER,
    serialNumber INTEGER,
    signature AlgorithmIdentifier,
    issuer SEQUENCE of PrintableString,
    SEQUENCE {
        notBefore      UTCTime,
        notAfter       UTCTime
    }
    subject SEQUENCE of PrintableString,
    subjectPublicKeyInfo SubjectPublicKeyInfo,
    [...]
}
```

Reference: <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2459#page-15>

ASN.1 Tags (serve as Types Identifiers)

Basic types (primitive)

BOOLEAN

INTEGER

NULL

OID

UTCTIME, GENERALIZEDTIME

OCTET STRING

BIT STRING

UTF8String, PRINTABLESTRING, . . .

ENUM

Structured types (constructed)

SEQUENCE, SEQUENCE OF

SET, SET OF

ASN.1 Tag Classes (give Context Definition to Tags)

- Specify encoding instructions in order to remove ambiguity where necessary
- It helps defining our own tags using a class and a tag value
- Tags can be encoded using 1 byte, up to 6 bytes ($\text{uint} < 2^{31} - 1$ max)
- Available classes are:
UNIVERSAL (default), APPLICATION, CONTEXT SPECIFIC or PRIVATE
- Classes encoding can be IMPLICIT or EXPLICIT

(Binary) Encodings for ASN.1

- BER – Basic Encoding Rules
- DER – Distinguished Encoding Rules
- CER – Canonical Encoding Rules
- XER – Basic XML Encoding Rules
- CXER – Canonical XML Encoding Rules
- EXER – Extended XML Encoding Rules
- OER – Octet Encoding Rules
- JER – JSON Encoding Rules
- . . .

DER Encoded X.509 certificate

```

Certificate ::= SEQUENCE {
    tbsCertificate      TBSCertificate,
    signatureAlgorithm  AlgorithmIdentifier,
    signature            BIT STRING
}

TBSCertificate ::= SEQUENCE {
    version INTEGER,
    serialNumber INTEGER,
    signature AlgorithmIdentifier,
    issuer SEQUENCE of PrintableString,
    SEQUENCE {
        notBefore      UTCTime,
        notAfter       UTCTime
    }
    subject SEQUENCE of PrintableString,
    subjectPublicKeyInfo SubjectPublicKeyInfo,
    [...]
}
    
```

```

00000000 30 82 0e 0a 30 82 0c f2 a0 03 02 01 02 02 11 00 |0...0.....|
00000010 df 5b 69 1b 21 76 4a 32 12 1c 2f 37 8b e5 96 d3 |. [i.!vJ2../7...|
00000020 30 0d 06 09 2a 86 48 86 f7 0d 01 01 0b 05 00 30 |0...*.H.....0|
00000030 3b 31 0b 30 09 06 03 55 04 06 13 02 55 53 31 1e |;1.0...U...US1.|
00000040 30 1c 06 03 55 04 0a 13 15 47 6f 6f 67 6c 65 20 |0...U...Google |
00000050 54 72 75 73 74 20 53 65 72 76 69 63 65 73 31 0c |Trust Services1.|
00000060 30 0a 06 03 55 04 03 13 03 57 52 32 30 1e 17 0d |0...U...WR20...|
00000070 32 35 30 31 32 37 30 38 33 35 32 32 37 5a 17 0d 32 |250127083527Z..2|
00000080 35 30 34 32 31 30 38 33 35 32 36 5a 30 17 31 15 |50421083526Z0.1.|
00000090 30 13 06 03 55 04 03 0c 0c 2a 2e 67 6f 6f 67 6c |0...U...*.googl|
000000a0 65 2e 63 6f 6d 30 59 30 13 06 07 2a 86 48 ce 3d |e.com0Y0...*.H.=|
000000b0 02 01 06 08 2a 86 48 ce 3d 03 01 07 03 42 00 04 |...*.H.=...B..|
000000c0 a0 26 86 48 d6 05 d9 37 36 b3 e3 d0 44 3e 64 5f |.&.H...76...D>d_|
000000d0 61 88 9c ae 3d c3 52 01 44 5e 91 7f de e2 c6 a8 |a...=.R.D^.....|
000000e0 b3 83 12 1f 03 81 ad 64 96 79 80 08 e4 d1 25 87 |.....d.y....%|
000000f0 80 e4 59 f8 2b e0 9c c5 1b ca 2c 7b 85 b9 a8 7f |..Y.+.....,{....|
00000100 a3 82 0b f6 30 82 0b f2 30 0e 06 03 55 1d 0f 01 |...0...0...U...|
00000110 01 ff 04 04 03 02 07 80 30 13 06 03 55 1d 25 04 |.....0...U.%|
00000120 0c 30 0a 06 08 2b 06 01 05 05 07 03 01 30 0c 06 |.0...+.....0..|
[...]
00000dd0 0f 69 72 de 53 81 6f 12 7b 4c e2 7f 00 c1 bb a4 |.ir.S.o.{L.....|
00000de0 d1 83 82 cc 3b 52 8e 21 5a 97 ca d2 9c e1 9b 6a |....;R.!Z.....j|
00000df0 8a d2 ca 67 a0 39 c7 cf 86 1a f3 9b 65 26 3c b5 |...g.9.....e<.|
00000e00 0a 12 1d 95 fb 60 4d 8b ff 4a d8 07 4b fe |.....`M..J..K.|
00000e0e
    
```



BER/DER structure encodings

- Byte based binary formats
- TLV – **T**ype(aka Tag), **L**ength, **V**alue
- BER allows encoding of a given ASN.1 structure in multiple ways
- BER is useful for streams (content not known in advance)
- DER is a subset of BER along with canonicalization rules
- ⇒ DER only allows a single encoding for a given ASN.1 structure
- ⇒ That's why it is used for signed data structures (fixed content)

DER Tag & Class encoding (first byte)

Tag (hex byte)	Tag name
02	INTEGER
03	BIT STRING
0C	UTF8String
10 (Constructed : 30)	SEQUENCE and SEQUENCE OF
13	PrintableString
17	UTCTime
...	...

Class	Bit #7	Bit #6
Universal	0	0
Application	0	1
Context-specific	1	0
Private	1	1

IMPLICIT class encoding

```

  /--/--> Tag Class
  / /
Bit #7 #6 #5 #4 #3 #2 #1 #0
      \ \--\--\--\--\--> Tag
      \
      \--> Primitive or Constructed

```

- Bit #5 indicates a Constructed tag Vs a Primitive tag
- Bits #7 & #6 are use for class encoding

EXPLICIT class encoding

- The tag in embedded into a surrounding SEQUENCE that holds the class encoding

DER TLV encoding example

```

my_struct ::= SEQUENCE {
    int0 INTEGER:0x12
    int1 INTEGER:0x34
}

/--> type: SEQUENCE
/ /--> length: 6 bytes
/ /
30 06 /--/--/-----/--/--/--> value: the two DER encoded INTEGERS
      02 01 / / / /
      \ \ 12 / / /
      \ \ \ 02 01 /
      \ \ \ \ \ 34
      \ \ \ \ \ \--> value: 0x34
      \ \ \ \ \ \--> length: 1 byte
      \ \ \ \ \ \--> type: INTEGER
      \ \ \ \
      \ \ \--> value: 0x12
      \ \--> length: 1 byte
      \--> type: INTEGER

```

DER binary encoding (1) - binary output

```

$ echo | openssl s_client -connect google.com:443 | openssl x509 -outform DER | hexdump -C
00000000  30 82 0e 0a 30 82 0c f2 a0 03 02 01 02 02 11 00 |0...0.....|
00000010  df 5b 69 1b 21 76 4a 32 12 1c 2f 37 8b e5 96 d3 |.[i.!vJ2../7....|
00000020  30 0d 06 09 2a 86 48 86 f7 0d 01 01 0b 05 00 30 |0...*.H.....0|
00000030  3b 31 0b 30 09 06 03 55 04 06 13 02 55 53 31 1e |;1.0...U...US1.|
00000040  30 1c 06 03 55 04 0a 13 15 47 6f 6f 67 6c 65 20 |0...U...Google |
00000050  54 72 75 73 74 20 53 65 72 76 69 63 65 73 31 0c |Trust Services1.|
00000060  30 0a 06 03 55 04 03 13 03 57 52 32 30 1e 17 0d |0...U...WR20...|
00000070  32 35 30 31 32 37 30 38 33 35 32 37 5a 17 0d 32 |250127083527Z..2|
00000080  35 30 34 32 31 30 38 33 35 32 36 5a 30 17 31 15 |50421083526Z0.1.|
00000090  30 13 06 03 55 04 03 0c 0c 2a 2e 67 6f 6f 67 6c |0...U...*.googl|
000000a0  65 2e 63 6f 6d 30 59 30 13 06 07 2a 86 48 ce 3d |e.com0Y0...*.H.=|
000000b0  02 01 06 08 2a 86 48 ce 3d 03 01 07 03 42 00 04 |....*.H.=....B..|
000000c0  a0 26 86 48 d6 05 d9 37 36 b3 e3 d0 44 3e 64 5f |.&.H...76...D>d_|
000000d0  61 88 9c ae 3d c3 52 01 44 5e 91 7f de e2 c6 a8 |a...=.R.D^.....|
000000e0  b3 83 12 1f 03 81 ad 64 96 79 80 08 e4 d1 25 87 |.....d.y....%.|
000000f0  80 e4 59 f8 2b e0 9c c5 1b ca 2c 7b 85 b9 a8 7f |..Y.+.....,{....|
[...]
00000df0  8a d2 ca 67 a0 39 c7 cf 86 1a f3 9b 65 26 3c b5 |...g.9.....e<..|
00000e00  0a 12 1d 95 fb 60 4d 8b ff 4a d8 07 4b fe |.....`M..J..K.|
00000e0e

```

DER binary encoding (2) - openssl x509 command

```
$ echo | openssl s_client -connect google.com:443 | openssl x509 -outform d | openssl x509 -inform d -text -noout
Certificate:
  Data:
    Version: 3 (0x2)
    Serial Number:
      df:5b:69:1b:21:76:4a:32:12:1c:2f:37:8b:e5:96:d3
    Signature Algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption
    Issuer: C = US, O = Google Trust Services, CN = WR2
    Validity
      Not Before: Jan 27 08:35:27 2025 GMT
      Not After : Apr 21 08:35:26 2025 GMT
    Subject: CN = *.google.com
    Subject Public Key Info:
      Public Key Algorithm: id-ecPublicKey
      Public-Key: (256 bit)
      pub:
        04:a0:26:86:48:d6:05:d9:37:36:b3:e3:d0:44:3e:
        [...]
        7b:85:b9:a8:7f
      ASN1 OID: prime256v1
      NIST CURVE: P-256
    X509v3 extensions:
      X509v3 Key Usage: critical
      Digital Signature
  [...]
```

DER binary encoding (3) - openssl asn1parse command

```
$ man openssl-asn1parse
[...]
NAME
    openssl-asn1parse, asn1parse - ASN.1 parsing tool
[..]
DESCRIPTION
    The asn1parse command is a diagnostic utility that can parse
    ASN.1 structures. It can also be used to extract data from ASN.1
    formatted data.
[...]
```

DER binary encoding (4) - openssl asn1parse command

```
$ echo | openssl s_client -connect google.com:443 | openssl x509 -outform d | openssl asn1parse -inform d -i
  0:d=0  hl=4 l=3594 cons: SEQUENCE
  4:d=1  hl=4 l=3314 cons: SEQUENCE
  8:d=2  hl=2 l=  3 cons: cont [ 0 ]
10:d=3  hl=2 l=  1 prim: INTEGER           :02
13:d=2  hl=2 l= 17 prim: INTEGER           :DF5B691B21764A32121C2F378BE596D3
32:d=2  hl=2 l= 13 cons: SEQUENCE
34:d=3  hl=2 l=  9 prim: OBJECT            :sha256WithRSAEncryption
45:d=3  hl=2 l=  0 prim: NULL
47:d=2  hl=2 l= 59 cons: SEQUENCE
49:d=3  hl=2 l= 11 cons: SET
51:d=4  hl=2 l=  9 cons: SEQUENCE
53:d=5  hl=2 l=  3 prim: OBJECT            :countryName
58:d=5  hl=2 l=  2 prim: PRINTABLESTRING :US
62:d=3  hl=2 l= 30 cons: SET
64:d=4  hl=2 l= 28 cons: SEQUENCE
66:d=5  hl=2 l=  3 prim: OBJECT            :organizationName
71:d=5  hl=2 l= 21 prim: PRINTABLESTRING :Google Trust Services
94:d=3  hl=2 l= 12 cons: SET
96:d=4  hl=2 l= 10 cons: SEQUENCE
98:d=5  hl=2 l=  3 prim: OBJECT            :commonName
103:d=5 hl=2 l=  3 prim: PRINTABLESTRING :WR2
[...]
```

An X.509 certificate in PEM format

```
$ echo | openssl s_client -connect google.com:443 | openssl x509
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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[...]
6bVuRg8RIWQi7fpCgqioGswTqeLIKzaALCxcwKhXy4PaXLeU4FvEntM4n8Awbuk
0YOCzDtSjiFal8rSn0GbaorSymeg0cfPhhrzm2UmPLUKEh2V+2BNi/9K2AdL/g==
-----END CERTIFICATE-----
```

The PEM format

```
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----  
MIIOcjCCDPKgAwIBAgIRAN9baRshdkoyEhwvN4v1ltMwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQELBQAw  
OzELMAkGA1UEBhMCVVMxHjAcBgNVBAoTFUdvb2dsZSBUcnVzdCBTZXJ2aWNlczEM  
MAoGA1UEAxMDV1IyMB4XDTI1MDEyNzA4MzUyN1oXDTI1MDQyMTA4MzUyNlowFzEV  
MBMGA1UEAwwMKi5nb29nbGUuY29tMFkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQcDQgAE  
oCaGSNYF2Tc2s+PQRD5kX2GInK49w1IBRF6RF97ixqizgxIfA4GtZJZ5gAjk0SWH  
g0RZ+CvgnMUbyix7hbmof60CC/YwggvyMA4GA1UdDwEB/wQEAwIHgDATBgNVHSUE  
DDAKBggrBgEFBQcDATAMBgNVHRMBAf8EAjAAMB0GA1UdDgQWBBTmdR9tqDky5r2V  
7LHRlNvVU4H4FDAfBgNVHSMEGDAWgBTeGx7teRXUPjckwyG77DQ5bUKyMDBYBggr  
BgEFBQcBAQRMMEOwIQYIKwYBBQUHMAAGGFWh0dHA6Ly9vLnBraS5nb29nL3dyMjAl  
[...]  
/4bgeLYcnWuE2oydoR9Vr/PpKGZcefWrb5oNu5Ttuui6VwD2edlM8IcVG+n0KFKH  
bydJ2Ra5KFCmBmkFq8ZVi6zHLLdvk8B5qIeaq7VsRycPFsEUc9mjFI7g04vBaHkc  
gPzk  
-----END CERTIFICATE-----
```

- Privacy-Enhanced Mail
- IETF RFC 1421 and IETF RFC 7468
- Base64 + surrounding BEGIN/END tags
- Useful for transport of binary structures over text-based channels such as email

The PEM format - Transport over text channels

Valid types (from openssl-format-options(1)):

```
RSA PUBLIC KEY
X509 CERTIFICATE
DSA PRIVATE KEY
NEW CERTIFICATE REQUEST
ANY PRIVATE KEY
CERTIFICATE
CERTIFICATE REQUEST
CMS
DH PARAMETERS
DSA PARAMETERS
DSA PUBLIC KEY
EC PARAMETERS
EC PRIVATE KEY
ECDSA PUBLIC KEY
ENCRYPTED PRIVATE KEY
PARAMETERS
PKCS #7 SIGNED DATA
PKCS7
PRIVATE KEY
PUBLIC KEY
RSA PRIVATE KEY
SSL SESSION PARAMETERS
TRUSTED CERTIFICATE
X509 CRL
X9.42 DH PARAMETERS
```

Enough with the boring stuff ...

CVE-2022-0778 & cryptographic data structure editing

March 2022 - CVE-2022-0778 - OpenSSL Advisory

```
Severity
  High
Published
  15 March 2022
Title
  Infinite loop in BN_mod_sqrt() reachable when parsing certificates
Found by
  Tavis Ormandy (Google)
Affected versions
  OpenSSL
    from 3.0.0 before 3.0.2
    from 1.1.1 before 1.1.1n
    from 1.0.2 before 1.0.2zd
```

<https://openssl-library.org/news/vulnerabilities/index.html#CVE-2022-0778>

The first PoC was released:

<https://github.com/drago-96/CVE-2022-0778>

```
The discovered vulnerability triggers an infinite loop in the function
BN_mod_sqrt() of OpenSSL while parsing an elliptic curve key. This means that a
maliciously crafted X.509 certificate can DoS any unpatched server.
```

```
The core of the vulnerability is in the parsing of EC keys with points in
compressed format:
[...]
```

This PoC involves crafting a new X.509 certificate or modifying an existing one

asn1template.pl - my solution to this problem

```
$ man openssl-asn1parse  
[...]  
-genstr string, -genconf file  
    Generate encoded data based on string, file or both  
    using ASN1_generate_nconf(3) format. [...]  
[...]
```

Presented at PTS 2023 and Hack.lu 2023 (as a Lightning Talk)

<https://github.com/wllm-rbnt/asn1template>

asn1template.pl - how it works

Internal structure of the script:

- Reads the output of the `asn1parse` OpenSSL app
(a **visual representation** of the tree structure)
- Reconstructs the ASN.1 structure tree
- Traverses the tree recursively, depth-first
- and writes the `-genconf` compatible output `ASN1_generate_nconf(3)`
(a **specification** of the tree structure)
- First version written around 2010. `der-ascii` did not exist back then.
- Written in Perl, depends on the OpenSSL CLI utility only

openssl asn1parse command & asn1template.pl

```
$ openssl asn1parse -in test.der -i -inform D
0:d=0 hl=2 l= 18 cons: SEQUENCE
2:d=1 hl=2 l=  8 cons: SEQUENCE
4:d=2 hl=2 l=  6 cons: SEQUENCE
6:d=3 hl=2 l=  4 prim:  INTEGER           :76543210
12:d=1 hl=2 l=  6 cons: SEQUENCE
14:d=2 hl=2 l=  4 prim:  INTEGER           :01234567
```

```
$ asn1template.pl test.der | tee test.tpl
asn1 = SEQUENCE:seq1@0-2-18
[seq1@0-2-18]
field2@2-2-8 = SEQUENCE:seq2@2-2-8
field3@12-2-6 = SEQUENCE:seq3@12-2-6
[seq2@2-2-8]
field4@4-2-6 = SEQUENCE:seq4@4-2-6
[seq4@4-2-6]
field5@6-2-4 = INTEGER:0x76543210
[seq3@12-2-6]
field6@14-2-4 = INTEGER:0x01234567
```

Using openssl asn1parse -genconf

```
$ openssl asn1parse -genconf test.tpl -out test_reconstructed.der
```

```
$ openssl asn1parse -in test_reconstructed.der -i -inform D
0:d=0 hl=2 l= 18 cons: SEQUENCE
2:d=1 hl=2 l=  8 cons: SEQUENCE
4:d=2 hl=2 l=  6 cons: SEQUENCE
6:d=3 hl=2 l=  4 prim: INTEGER           :76543210
12:d=1 hl=2 l=  6 cons: SEQUENCE
14:d=2 hl=2 l=  4 prim: INTEGER           :01234567
```

```
$ diff test.der test_reconstructed.der
$ echo $?
0
```

Editing the template

```
$ sed -i -e 's/INTEGER:0x01234567/PRINTABLESTRING:HELLO/' test.tpl
$ openssl asn1parse -genconf test.tpl -out test_reconstructed_2.der -i
 0:d=0  hl=2 l= 19 cons: SEQUENCE
 2:d=1  hl=2 l=  8 cons:  SEQUENCE
 4:d=2  hl=2 l=  6 cons:   SEQUENCE
 6:d=3  hl=2 l=  4 prim:    INTEGER           :76543210
12:d=1  hl=2 l=  7 cons:  SEQUENCE
14:d=2  hl=2 l=  5 prim:  PRINTABLESTRING  :HELLO
```

```
$ openssl asn1parse -in test_reconstructed.der -i -inform D
 0:d=0  hl=2 l= 18 cons: SEQUENCE
 2:d=1  hl=2 l=  8 cons:  SEQUENCE
 4:d=2  hl=2 l=  6 cons:   SEQUENCE
 6:d=3  hl=2 l=  4 prim:    INTEGER           :76543210
12:d=1  hl=2 l=  6 cons:  SEQUENCE
14:d=2  hl=2 l=  4 prim:    INTEGER           :01234567
```

The story behind this talk

Hack.lu 2024 ...

Would you present a lightning talk ?

Idea !

I remembered writing this in the README file of [asn1template](#)'s repository:

```
"Line feeds in OCTET STRINGs break the conversion."
```

This happens because [asn1template](#) treats each line of `asn1parse` as a fully contained item, line feeds being considered as the item separator.

⇒ It's not always the case

Idea !

Corpus of 1.7M X.509 Certificates:

<https://github.com/johndoe31415/x509-cert-testcorpus>

Example of broken structure:

```
[...]
 651:d=4  hl=2 l= 15 cons: SEQUENCE
 653:d=5  hl=2 l=  3 prim:  OBJECT          :X509v3 Certificate Policies
 658:d=5  hl=2 l=  8 prim:  OCTET STRING       :AAAA
BBBB
 668:d=4  hl=2 l= 76 cons: SEQUENCE
 670:d=5  hl=2 l=  3 prim:  OBJECT          :X509v3 CRL Distribution Points
 675:d=5  hl=2 l= 69 prim:  OCTET STRING       [HEX DUMP]:30433041A03FA03D863B68747470[...]
[...]
```

Similar bug reported in 2021

openssl x509 -text output can contain control characters #15254
Open

dkg opened on May 13, 2021

When using `openssl x509 -text` to get a textual representation of an X.509 certificate, in some cases the output can contain control characters.

For example, using this command on the certificate below injects `\x0d` (CR, the carriage return, aka `\r`) in the section displaying `S/MIME Capabilities` contents:

```

-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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-----END CERTIFICATE-----

```

I note that most non-printable characters in the `-text` output of this variable render as `.` -- i think this is probably what should happen for `\r`.

Assignees

No one assigned

Labels

Inactive **triaged: bug**

Type

No type

Projects

No projects

Milestone

No milestone

Relationships

None yet

Experiments & findings

Goal: embed some ANSI art into text fields of a certificate



Requirement for this to work:

terminal escape sequences, control and Unicode characters must be **printed raw**

2 approaches:

- use a CSR configuration file (cfr. [man openssl-req](#))
- generate a binary structure from a template with a **placeholder** of same length as implanted data, then replace in binary file directly (adjust signature)

ANSI art source: <https://github.com/erkin/ponysay>

Terminal Control Characters & Sequences

- Control Characters (cfr. man ascii)
- Control Sequence Introducer (CSI) ⇒ introduced by `^[[`
- Operating System Command (OSC) ⇒ introduced by `^]`

References:

- https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ANSI_escape_code
- "Weaponizing Plain Text ANSI Escape Sequences as a Forensic Nightmare" by STÖK ⇒ <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KD1jEIMSjA4>

Control Characters

Control characters are the ones with hex value [less than 0x20](#) (cfr. [man ascii](#))

Hex	Char	Ctrl-Key
00	NUL '\0' (null character)	^@
[...]		
07	BEL '\a' (bell)	^G
08	BS '\b' (backspace)	^H
09	HT '\t' (horizontal tab)	^I
0A	LF '\n' (new line)	^J
0B	VT '\v' (vertical tab)	^K
0C	FF '\f' (form feed)	^L
0D	CR '\r' (carriage ret)	^M
[...]		
1B	ESC (escape)	^[
[...]		
20	SPACE	N/A

Mainly used for [cursor movement](#), but also the entry point for [Terminal Escape Sequences](#)

Terminal Escape Sequences

Terminal Escape Sequences are used for color changes, cursor movements, terminal configuration, ...

```

/-----> Regular text
/ /-----> Switch to reverse video & red (CSI sequence)
/ / /-----> Red background & black text
/ / / /-----> Reset escape sequence (CSI sequence)
/ / / / /-----> Regular text
$ echo -e "xxx \e[7;31m yyy \e[0m zzz"
```



Finding #1

- Unicode is printed from text fields such as CN, OU, ... for recent versions of OpenSSL (>= 3.2.4 from current release set, fixed in PR #26932)
- As a side effect, control characters & terminal escape sequences are printed raw (unescaped)
- Worked since PR #16583

```
commit 86cfd132ffc4f6198cc640a29c293850c0a59914
Date:   Sat Sep 11 13:56:28 2021 +0200
```

```
    Use -nameopt utf8 by default
```

```
unsigned long get_nameopt(void)
{
-   return (nmflag_set) ? nmflag : XN_FLAG_ONELINE;
+   return (nmflag_set) ? nmflag : XN_FLAG_SEP_CPLUS_SPC | ASN1_STRFLGS_UTF8_CONVERT;
```

Demo - ANSI art injected in CN

ANSI art injection in CN field with OpenSSL 3.0.16

Control characters and escape sequences are escaped correctly

```
Certificate:
  Data:
    Version: 3 (0x2)
    Serial Number:
      cf:3f:2b:05:6f:a5:7a:74:10:f0:78:df:4f:11:39:b4
    Signature Algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption
    Issuer: C = US, O = Google Trust Services, CN = WR2
    Validity
      Not Before: Dec  2 08:37:44 2024 GMT
      Not After : Feb 24 08:37:43 2025 GMT
    Subject: CN = " \0B\0D          \1B]P8875F5F\1B[30;01m\E2\96\84\1B]P38
75F5F\1B[43m\1B]P9AF5F00\1B[31m\E2\96\84\E2\96\84\E2\96\84\1B]P8875F5F\1B[30m\E2\96\88\1B]P000
0000\1B[49m\E2\96\80\1B]P7AAAAAA\1B[39m  \1B[00m\0B\0D          \1B]P8875F5F\1B[30;01m\E2\96\
84\E2\96\84\1B]P7AAAAAA\1B[39m          \1B]P8875F5F\1B[30m\E2\96\84\1B]P3875F5F\1B[43m\1B]P9A
F5F00\1B[31m\E2\96\84\E2\96\84\1B]P3AF5F00\1B[43m\E2\96\88\1B]PBAF875F\1B[33m\E2\96\84\1B]P3AF
875F\1B[43m\1B]P8875F5F\1B[30m\E2\96\84\1B]P0000000\1B[49m\E2\96\80\1B]P7AAAAAA\1B[39m  \1
B[00m\0B\0D          \1B]P3875F5F\1B[43m\1B]P8875F5F\1B[30;01m\E2\96\88\1B]P3AF875F\1B[43m\1B]PB
AF875F\1B[33m\E2\96\88\E2\96\88\1B]P3875F5F\1B[43m\E2\96\84\1B]P0000000\1B[49m\1B]P8875F5F\1B[
30m\E2\96\84\E2\96\84\E2\96\84\1B]P3875F5F\1B[43m\1B]PBAF875F\1B[33m\E2\96\84\E2\96\84\E2\96\8
4\1B]P0000000\1B[49m\1B]P8875F5F\1B[30m\E2\96\84\E2\96\84\1B]P3875F5F\1B[43m\1B]P9AF5F00\1B[31
m\E2\96\84\1B]P3AF5F00\1B[43m\E2\96\88\E2\96\88\E2\96\88\1B]PBAF875F\1B[33m\E2\96\84\1B]P3AF87
5F\1B[43m\E2\96\88\1B]P3875F5F\1B[43m\1B]P8875F5F\1B[30m\E2\96\88\1B]P0000000\1B[49m\1B]P7AAAA
AA\1B[39m  \1B[00m\0B\0D          \1B]P8875F5F\1B[30;01m\E2\96\84\1B]P7D7D7AF\1B[47m\1B]P8000
000\1B[30m\E2\96\84\1B]P0000000\1B[40m\1B]PFD7D7AF\1B[37m\E2\96\84\1B]P8000000\1B[30m\E2\96\88
```

ANSI art injection in CN field with OpenSSL 3.4.1 - it works !

```
Certificate:
  Data:
    Version: 3 (0x2)
    Serial Number:
      cf:3f:2b:05:6f:a5:7a:74:10:f0:78:df:4f:11:39:b4
    Signature Algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption
    Issuer: C=US, O=Google Trust Services, CN=WR2
    Validity
      Not Before: Dec  2 08:37:44 2024 GMT
      Not After : Feb 24 08:37:43 2025 GMT
    Subject: CN=
```



Text injection in CN field with OpenSSL 3.4.1

```
Extensions: none
Signature : ecdsa-with-SHA256
            30:44:02:20:1D:F0:55:20:CD:2D:7D:47:5A:98:F5:1C:
            6C:9B:37:22:8D:2F:EC:68:D8:19:F8:4C:F1:81:B5:E9:
            D6:BA:72:FB:02:20:62:A2:CA:3C:6A:D5:22:B2:14:72:
            02:7F:3D:91:D6:C1:07:08:26:F6:77:B8:3D:78:FE:89:
            53:C7:8F:FB:D7:3B
Signature Algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption
Signature Value:
0e:0d:75:66:4c:68:e9:37:d6:12:e1:d9:07:91:4f:d5:c7:e4:
89:c4:59:ad:69:ff:1c:ef:10:22:2a:da:c5:58:69:97:18:24:
cc:6f:e1:68:e6:14:7a:5d:19:54:92:46:72:6c:a6:31:39:76:
50:d2:59:22:8f:74:bf:58:7b:9d:83:8b:17:dd:7f:3d:24:43:
33:0b:de:c8:11:5b:8e:92:6b:4d:ed:c1:41:7c:55:0b:33:03:
55:ee:6f:5c:b7:84:c5:31:0e:aa:37:c9:d2:73:33:18:bd:a1:
b8:c9:bb:0e:81:93:58:ec:52:a2:e8:09:5c:40:a3:c3:c2:51:
ca:08:ee:4a:75:6b:1b:64:99:dd:d1:6e:ec:61:4b:12:05:f5:
c3:19:47:38:38:83:ec:aa:62:02:c4:46:c7:91:85:bc:d9:be:
e2:5b:d5:16:37:7c:70:6c:20:a3:c5:f2:a5:70:fa:f2:a1:93:
4d:a0:f0:47:ae:2e:cc:30:5b:f3:b2:c2:5b:74:6b:ef:07:94:
54:b4:61:19:e9:e5:b5:5e:2f:3e:e2:4c:fd:4e:8f:05:35:c3:
d8:d6:ce:54:5a:59:7a:40:22:dd:fc:66:b6:fd:84:b1:84:f0:
39:9c:ba:09:d2:3c:32:98:64:a3:40:5a:bc:e1:db:1f:f9:58:
56:7f:04:de

X509v3 Subject Key Identifier:
D2:7B:A8:2C:93:34:D8:AC:94:21:A8:D8:98:06:AE:CD:3E:1D:B7:8C
Signature Algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption
Signature Value:
70:06:14:85:b7:de:9c:b4:4b:78:6a:5c:f5:7d:fb:7b:cb:92:
e2:55:64:2b:ba:86:a1:ac:72:7d:14:40:41:6f:7e:79:d6:11:
44:c5:96:71:60:a0:12:bd:e1:cd:15:39:3a:1c:aa:3b:ca:9d:
52:c4:ef:80:e8:11:08:df:95:86:65:89:8f:71:0b:c4:00:5c:
36:44:81:11:1b:f7:7f:a4:ea:85:b9:fb:6d:3a:f6:f2:66:35:
19:83:65:d9:24:2f:0c:22:03:94:36:9e:c8:c3:a9:dd:41:d0:
ba:5a:d4:5c:01:5d:4b:c2:a0:5d:da:05:18:06:ed:3b:2a:02:
36:ea:83:ff:af:4a:36:a4:6a:cd:91:57:eb:b4:2b:0a:46:0a:
98:20:78:91:45:e7:29:10:f6:f8:38:82:a2:ad:0d:7b:f3:8f:
79:85:05:78:7b:f7:4c:14:4d:94:da:db:df:29:45:cf:ac:96:
a4:a5:f5:82:a3:c4:93:77:d9:66:09:a1:01:c8:e1:07:88:d1:
63:6c:fd:55:13:73:bc:3f:18:f2:ca:bf:46:2e:94:34:4f:17:
db:08:0e:88:1e:a1:22:a1:c1:4a:35:f0:7f:18:b3:88:d7:79:
69:84:a1:b7:fc:4a:cc:b4:a0:85:59:41:6d:fe:3e:75:c1:1e:
50:26:10:9b
```

- When transposing this technique to text, what comes after the injection point is still printed
- But it does not happen with the ANSI art ?!?

- A double signature is visible in this example

Finding #2

Unterminated OSC sequence, on Gnome Terminal (& some others) stops the text output

```
$ echo -ne "bla\nbla\n" > bla
$ echo -ne "bli\nbli\n" > bli
$ cat bla <(echo -e "\e]") bli
bla
bla
$ cat bla <(echo -e "\e]") bli | grep bli
bli
bli
```

We can use that behavior to hide text output after the injected implant

Text injection with termination in CN field with OpenSSL 3.4.1

```
00:c0:22:c1:80:9e:fe:bd:9f:78:d8:34:b8:b8:30:
ab:a5:ba:b0:d3:8f:f2:fa:33:65:34:fa:bf:b2:5e:
eb:19:01:7f:7c:f3:75:7e:28:30:98:40:84:44:1e:
75:eb:58:ea:4a:cd:79:49:32:a4:2d:ae:c7:d9:fc:
8d:f9:be:6e:a2:2b:03:71:6c:f8:79:91:56:c5:b2:
c7:ff:61:60:a5:7f:56:5d:9a:bf:6a:19:be:05:24:
1c:9a:4b:78:4c:d3:a8:60:19:9e:af:12:50:ba:9e:
a5:c3:0a:ba:56:a5:8f:f5:c3:0a:08:db:76:c1:71:
31:b9:53:27:2b:b4:c3:41:06:8d:36:68:4f:44:b1:
cf:2f:67:c4:89:b8:7a:c9:bd:06:73:9f:85:e7:77:
6e:52:0a:46:9d:fd:f6:5f:dd:76:1c:4b:71:dd:f4:
5f:25:5a:22:88:d2:41:86:24:8d:35:94:b6:87:89:
f8:e6:0c:07:b3:32:48:9c:5d:d3:2a:32:fc:df:31:
31:4e:66:a6:50:6e:ff:30:a3:2c:75:8a:2f:e3:e3:
df:5b:00:f5:ef:a0:d8:d7:83:79:64:ad:23:08:98:
5b:b8:05:ec:19:15:99:ac:36:5d:52:19:9b:fa:2b:
8a:23:b1:50:bf:8c:d0:ca:5f:8c:6e:e5:13:cb:02:
cd:9f
Exponent: 65537 (0x10001)
Attributes:
Requested Extensions:
X509v3 Key Usage:
Digital Signature
X509v3 Extended Key Usage:
TLS Web Server Authentication
X509v3 Subject Alternative Name:
DNS:bla.lu, DNS:www.bla.lu
Signature Algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption
Signature Value:
3d:a3:31:74:d6:45:c5:5a:83:66:62:07:4e:d9:58:15:24:f7:
28:76:26:c7:3e:03:7c:53:7d:91:9b:0d:1c:7d:d9:43:0b:d0:
db:97:35:65:ea:8d:48:8c:87:c4:16:66:7a:d2:e4:4b:1c:95:
ca:ed:2a:a9:9b:0c:05:d0:28:81:03:8e:d3:62:a3:5f:2e:65:
45:f4:7e:ca:76:ca:89:5c:cc:02:9a:12:3c:fb:f1:1c:6a:bb:
39:76:a2:72:d1:68:81:a4:4e:ae:fe:d6:bd:4c:9a:98:4f:cc:
12:da:03:80:74:8a:40:79:5c:c4:53:c2:df:0b:7c:c1:a8:15:
ec:b1:36:da:bd:4e:d1:ac:28:62:00:56:81:91:4b:ac:25:82:
9a:85:28:4c:d7:ae:c8:8e:db:f0:6f:e8:a4:ed:8b:9d:d8:e1:
51:76:43:47:c2:d9:b6:4a:c1:98:a0:97:9d:ab:6c:57:76:59:
48:b4:0d:e3:50:fe:fe:fa:72:c7:ab:f5:6d:5d:62:51:0e:bc:
9c:49:e6:67:f5:87:bd:a3:da:0d:53:2a:bf:f5:d6:25:23:67:
1a:7a:8e:86:54:0a:d0:8f:7d:65:0b:74:80:ab:47:4f:7e:df:
19:be:1c:43:58:28:a3:98:8c:c1:1d:53:46:98:7c:53:f6:a3:
a7:4c:f9:3a
```

Real world implications

- Different results for different terminal emulators (with ASCII only, or Unicode support)
- Other SSL/TLS toolkits also affected at various levels
- Also work with certificate requests . . .

Demo - Fake CSR injected in a valid CSR

Finding #3

- Content appended to SAN DNS fields is copied verbatim
- Except that '\n' must be replaced by something visually equivalent such as '\v'
- This works on all version of OpenSSL I tested ($\geq 0.9.7m$)

Demo - text injected in SAN


Were these techniques ever used ?

Corpus of 112M+ X.509 certificates from CIRCL's passive SSL project



<https://www.circl.lu/services/passive-ssl/>

Dataset size distribution histogram



Certificate oddities

```
Subject: C=UK, ST=Glasgow, L=Glasgow, O=Bellrock Technology Ltd, CN=${ansible_eth0[ipv4][address]}
```

```
Subject: C=FR, ST=Seed, L=Power, CN=${ServiceName}.alpharatio.cc
```

```
Subject: C=NG, ST=Enugu, L=ENUGU, O=Graceland Group of Schools, CN={{gracelandcloud.com}}
```

Certificate oddities

```
1.3.6.1.4.1.24255.2.1:  
  {"uuid": "1b444eb0-6474-4162-a78e-5e22c76bfe00", "service": "OUTSCAN"}
```

```
1.2.3.4.5.6.7.8.1:  
  {"attrs": {"hf.Affiliation": "health0", "hf.EnrollmentID": "ipfs0-health0", "hf.Type": "ipfs"}}
```

Certificate oddities

```
Subject: C=NO, ST=molde, L=molde, O=stormtek, OU=stormtek, CN=owncloud01, emailAddress=eivind^G^G@trollhousing.no
```

```
X509v3 Authority Key Identifier:
```

```
keyid:61:2F:38:E5:73:CC:22:6B:BE:45:25:23:0B:DF:89:7A:3F:CB:41:66
```

```
DirName:/C=US/ST=Kentuc\x08\x08\x08\x08\x08\x08\x08\x08Kentucky\x08\x08y  
/L=Lexinghto\x08\x08\x08ton/O=PRoj\x08\x08\x08rojh\x08i  
/CN=Rex Hall/emailAddress=mmufault@otm\x08\x08\x08hotmail.com
```

Certificate oddities

```
X509v3 Issuer Alternative Name:  
    0.,^...+..+.....8.....-----BEGIN PGP PRIVATE KEY BLOCK-----  
Version: BCPG v1.38b04  
  
lQPGBFcwpekBCADp7m4Z/FZHpkYPmXLo2/cuPd9wCUXFvrGas98HE0rhHhQ/apkU  
TAu49tr4iV2ks7jZuP4zVA81Iob7Po+CwLD5kYcCU0PjCH3LpmFfxXi0+GhFqM4a  
+KtnEFaDTi9PTBv++bhQ5ZmAAJG3Qte3Q1YTdD3uzXKEwKysSwvTGQ9RLbRp1Yo1  
ZoXQz lHYinEBuWoEU2dg0eKhtvi8k52PSxbFkk lf/GC0hZ+99tMnqzmS7Gl+csNJ  
a ll/VnNoVN2JKHf8szaPMKpv2xT lStz l6 lIMsdG5eswr0/Z7NqG2zsupnyn7bfPJ  
[...]
```

Certificate oddities

```
X509v3 Subject Alternative Name:  
DNESC[dESC^H^H, DNS:localhost, DNS:ip-172-31-19-174,  
DNS:xe7p-5jtg-6snv-lne4-wfug-oaqo-hqkn-44m2-s2a2-fsqi-pvnl-iqwm,  
IP Address:172.17.0.1, IP Address:34.252.55.170,  
IP Address:127.0.0.1, IP Address:172.31.19.174
```

```
Subject: C='', ST=^M"><zzz=zzz>;%x\, L=^M"><zzz=zzz>;%x\, O=^M"><zzz=zzz>;%x\  
OU=^M"><zzz=zzz>;%x\, CN=rbsec.net, emailAddress=^M"><zzz=zzz>;%x\
```

Conclusion

Be careful with the text output of the tools you use

... in the mean time, **less** might be useful

```
$ openssl x509 -text -noout -in certificate.pem | less
```

Bonus demo

Bonus demo

- There are no time management terminal control sequences, you cannot ask for a pause
- This video is composed of only 16 frames
- Most file space is used to waste time between frames by printing space characters and erasing them continuously
- Result --> 23 MBytes DER file (31 MBytes in PEM format)

The End